Presidential systems in the post-Soviet space. Is Juan Linz’s hypothesis correct?

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the political consequences of exercising the presidential form of government by the materials of a number of some post-Soviet States.

The hypothesis of the well-known political scientist Juan Linz about the shortcomings of the presidential system of government is confirmed in post-Soviet politics. Here, states with strong presidents demonstrate tendencies toward establishing personalist regimes. Concentration of power in the hands of the president tends to make the opposition weaker. Electoral processes are often imitative by nature, while competition in politics remains at an extremely low level.

An empirical analysis of post-Soviet politics demonstrated that political crises in presidential regimes sometimes lead to “color revolutions”, society is subject to deep splits, and regimes are deprived of time flexibility. The fact that it is impossible to quickly replace the president who lost legitimacy leads to a loss of stability of the entire system. Political stability in such systems of government can only be achieved by rejecting political competition.Linz’s assertion about the possibility of conflict between the president and parliament as a consequence of double democratic legitimacy, as well as the president’s striving for inefficient spending, is confirmed. An empirical analysis of political processes in the post-Soviet space proves the validity of theLinzhypothesis.