The widespread perception of the “Caribbean” crisis as a setback for the Soviet Union overlooks the major achievement that Moscow did score. This was Khrushchev’s success – which, unfortunately for his future in the Soviet leadership, he agreed to the Kennedys’ demand not to publicize – to gain the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. But within three years, the joint French-Israeli development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems threatened to plug the gap that had thus been created in the ring of nuclear-armed western pacts that were the subject of perennial Soviet fears. Documents and memoirs that surfaced in the early years after the USSR’s collapse, cross-checked against US and Israeli sources, reveal this motivation for, and the hitherto unknown features of, the Soviets’ response when in late 1965 an authoritative informant confirmed that despite domestic political change and US pressure, Israel was about to cross the nuclear threshold. This added urgency to Moscow’s regional considerations in favor of supporting an Arab attack on Israel, and produced what was in several respects a mirror-image of the Cuban affair. A joint plan was developed with Egypt, to provoke an Israeli first strike that would legitimize Soviet military intervention to “aid the victims of aggression” and ensure Israel’s defeat. The provocations included overflights of Israel’s nuclear facility by advanced Soviet aircraft; the intervention was to include targeting of the facility by Soviet strategic bombers. This plan’s fiasco in the Six-Day War of June 1967 shaped the Middle East as well as Soviet policy there for decades to come, as an indirect but distinct consequence of the Cuban crisis.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the present-day Englishlanguage historiography of the 1962 Caribbean Crisis. The article presents the opinions of the historians from the USA, Canada, Great Britain and Australia. The paper discusses the points of view of the “traditionalists” who criticize the actions of N.S. Khrushchev, and the “revisionists” who negatively assess the US foreign policy during that period – the policy that, in their opinion, mainly contributed to the unleashing of the crisis. The article also highlights a number of other issues related to the Caribbean Crisis: the participation in the events of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, the role of UN Secretary General U Thant in resolving the conflict, the need to expand the chronological framework of the crisis. The author comes to the conclusion that the discussion of the Caribbean Crisis in historiography should encourage an increase in the number of publications and inspire the solution of the previously insufficiently studied issues related to the conflict that happened 60 years ago.

The article is devoted to the study of the formation and development of the institute of Russian naval agents in Germany at the turn of the 19^th – 20^th centuries and its influence on the Russian-German relations in the naval sphere. Changes were identified in the approach to the appointment of Russian naval attachés in Germany, and that adjustment directly affected the quality and effectiveness of the work of Russian naval agents. The source base of the study includes the documents of the Main Naval Staff and the personal fund of Admiral F.V. Dubasov from the collection of the Russian State Archives of the Navy (RGA VMF). The author comes to the conclusion that the Russian naval agents in Germany at the turn of the 19^th – 20^th centuries acquired representative functions to the detriment of their main activities, which significantly affected the quality of work of the Russian naval agents.

The ongoing transformation of the digital space has modified the threat of online disinformation. Various actors search for the ways to mitigate its negative impact. This article examines the counter disinformation actions of the European Union. These actions rely on the cooperation of the EU institutions with civil society and online platforms. The goal of this study is to assess the involvement of various stakeholders in the process of countering disinformation through the analysis of the existing EU programs and strategies. The article studies the evolution of the EU’s policy and is based on a multistakeholder analysis of the disinformation-countering process. The study revealed the EU’sstrong reliance on civilsociety and platforms, as well as a lack oftransparent mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the adopted plans and strategies. The EU externalizes the threat and places excessive emphasis on the self-control of platforms. Yet, the negative impact of disinformation on society becomes recognized in the related EU policies (cybersecurity, education, etc.). This article illustrates important experience and indicates the EU’s strategic vision in tackling disinformation.

The paper analyzes the impact of the Cuban Missile crisis on today’s US-Cuban relations. Of course, the scale and historical significance of this event is so great that it simply could not have failed to leave its mark and to affect the further development of the conflict between the United States and Cuba. However, with a more explicit focus, the impact of the 1962 Missile crisis is reflected not in those aspects that are conventionally talked about, but in more fundamental (albeit short-lived) manifestations. In very general terms, the main legacy of the Caribbean crisis is manifested in the irrational, difficult-to-explain desire of a large part of the American establishment, commonly referred to as the neoconservatives (“hawks”), to tighten the sanctions policy against the Island, although the normalization of the US-Cuban relations is dictated by seeming common sense. Moving to full normalization and allowing the setting up of regular trade and economic ties, showing generosity and goodwill, the United States would find itself in a much better position. By repeatedly imposing harsh economic sanctions that do not lead to a resolution of the conflict, but have a detrimental effect on the standard of living of ordinary citizens, Washington exposes itself in a very unsightly light.

The article discusses the relationship between Canada and the USA during Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s premiership in 1957–1963. Based on the analysis of the relevant source and historiographical background, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that personal hostility and mutual misunderstanding between John Kennedy and John Diefenbaker shaped the nature of the relationship between Canada and the USA in 1961–1963. The author believes that Diefenbaker’s anti-Americanism in 1961–1963 did not have a clear ideological background, and was the result of a number of factors, and, above all, the populism of the Prime Minister of Canada, as well as his poor personal relations with John Kennedy. On the contrary, according to the author, in the 1957–1960 period, anti-Americanism was missing in the foreign policy strategy of Diefenbaker, and that is why the latter advocated a close military cooperation with the United States, which was implemented in 1958 through the conclusion of the NORAD agreement. From the author’s point of view, the relations between Canada and the USA in 1957–1963 underwent a serious transformation – from the consensus with Eisenhower to the complete lack of understanding with Kennedy. The latter failed to find a necessary approach to Diefenbaker who, guided by negative emotions towards Kennedy during the Caribbean crisis, did nothing to fulfill his allied obligations with regard to the United States. The author emphasizes that both sides are to blame for the deterioration of the relations between Canada and the USA in 1961–1963.

The article discusses the relationship between Canada and the USA during Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s premiership in 1957–1963. Based on the analysis of the relevant source and historiographical background, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that personal hostility and mutual misunderstanding between John Kennedy and John Diefenbaker shaped the nature of the relationship between Canada and the USA in 1961–1963. The author believes that Diefenbaker’s anti-Americanism in 1961–1963 did not have a clear ideological background, and was the result of a number of factors, and, above all, the populism of the Prime Minister of Canada, as well as his poor personal relations with John Kennedy. On the contrary, according to the author, in the 1957–1960 period, anti-Americanism was missing in the foreign policy strategy of Diefenbaker, and that is why the latter advocated a close military cooperation with the United States, which was implemented in 1958 through the conclusion of the NORAD agreement. From the author’s point of view, the relations between Canada and the USA in 1957–1963 underwent a serious transformation – from the consensus with Eisenhower to the complete lack of understanding with Kennedy. The latter failed to find a necessary approach to Diefenbaker who, guided by negative emotions towards Kennedy during the Caribbean crisis, did nothing to fulfill his allied obligations with regard to the United States. The author emphasizes that both sides are to blame for the deterioration of the relations between Canada and the USA in 1961–1963.

This article analyzes the impact of the Cuban missile crisis on the domestic and foreign policy, as well as on the transformation of the German political culture in the 1960’s. The research is based on a wide range of sources, including the German press publications, as well as the BND intelligence reports and transcripts of the negotiations between Chancellor K. Adenauer and the U.S. representatives during the acute phase of the conflict over Cuba (the reports and transcripts were published in 2012). The author examines the correlation between the Cuban missile crisis and the Spiegel affair in Germany and comes to the conclusion that both conflicts, developing in parallel, became a major factor in the political elites’ polarization in West Germany. Whereas the “Cold War party” around K. Adenauer sought to escalate tensions and prevent rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, the “detente party” advocated a new positioning of Germany on the world stage as an intermediary between East and West. Therefore, the Cuban missile crisis became the turning point in the development of a “new Eastern policy”, which Bonn implemented in the 1970’s under Chancellor W. Brandt. Furthermore, the author draws the conclusion that the “Cuban shock” should be considered as a prologue to the “1968 movement”, which resulted in the “new foundation of the Federal Republic” on the principles of left-liberal ideology and critical attitude to the Nazi past.

The aim of the study is to assess the specifics of the memorial positioning of the Caribbean crisis and the related events in the US video games. The work was carried out on the basis of an appeal to the case of the video game Call of Duty: Black Ops. The research methodology is based on a combination of the descriptive analysis and case studies. The author comes to the conclusion that the Call of Duty: Black Ops memorial mode contextually assumes that the actions of the United States on the eve and during the Caribbean crisis appear rational and morally justified, while the Soviet Union and the Cuban authorities acted as a source of significant risks and threats both to America and to the Cuban people themselves. At the same time, the illegal de facto actions of the US authorities are actually legitimized due to the background narrative, mainly expressed outside the textual form, through the activity approach and the formation of the context of perception. The creators of the game essentially reproduce the memorial narrative that is traditional for describing the Cuban Missile Crisis in American popular culture, which, among other things, involves the legitimization of a number of right-wing political groups from Latin America.